



WHERE STATE LAW HAS "MINIMUM AMOUNT"
REQUIREMENT FOR A DERIVATIVE SUIT, FEDERAL
RULE 23(b) REQUIRES ALL SHAREHOLDERS JOINED
TO MEET THE AMOUNT TO HAVE HELD
SHARES AT THE TIME OF THE INJURY
In a derivative suit under the federal district court's diversity juris-
diction, defendant's motion for a stay was granted on the ground that
plaintiff had not complied with the New York statute requiring that share-
holders bringing derivative suits own at least five per cent or $50,000
worth of the outstanding corporate stock or else post security for costs.'
Plaintiff joined other shareholders with sufficient shares to satisfy the
statutory minimum and moved to have the stay vacated. The court denied
the motion, holding that although the state minimum amount requirement
had been met, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b) 2 applied also, and
plaintiff had not alleged that the additional plaintiffs had been shareholders
at the time of the wrongful act. Kaufman v. Wolfson, 136 F. Supp. 939
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
New York has a "time of ownership" provision3 substantially the
same as Federal Rule 23(b). A state decision construing this provision
in conjunction with the statutory minimum was interpreted by the instant
court -4 as requiring only one of the shareholders joined to meet the minimum
amount to have held his shares at the time of the injury.6 As thus inter-
1. N.Y. GEN. Coas. LAW § 61-b.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) provides: "In an action brought to enforce a secondary
right on the part of one or more shareholders in an association, . . . the complaint
shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the
time of the transaction of which he complains.
3. N.Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 61 provides: "In any action brought by a shareholder
in the right of a foreign or domestic corporation it must be made to appear that the
plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains ..
4. Instant case at 941.
5. The instant case based its interpretation of New York law on Noel Associates
v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944) as did the court in
Fuller v. American Machine & Foundry Co., 95 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See
text at note 10 infra. While the Noel case does indicate that a plaintiff who held
some shares at the time of the injury would be permitted to buy enough shares per-
sonally to make up the statutory minimum if he did so before bringing suit, it does not
set a general rule that a plaintiff can join shareholders who acquire their shares after
the injury. The court did permit such joinder in the Noel case, but limited its per-
mission to the peculiar facts. In Noel plaintiff had begun suit before § 61-b was
enacted and had no opportunity to acquire the needed shares personally before begin-
ning suit. The court felt it would be better to allow joinder of persons who bought
their shares after the injury but before suit than to allow plaintiff to purchase more
shares himself after suit was begun, for the latter alternative would give him a chance
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preted, the state "time of ownership" provision conflicts with the parallel
Federal Rule, which the court construed as requiring that all shareholders
so joined must have held their shares at the time of the injury. Although
the instant court held the Federal Rule to apply, the law is not clear which
provision should prevail in the case of such conflict. In Gallup v. Cald-
well,6 the Third Circuit held that in a diversity case, when state law is not
settled as to whether a plaintiff must own his shares at the time of the
injury, the federal provision would apply; the court specifically left open
the question of which would govern if there were a direct conflict. In
Perrott v. United States Banking Corp.,' where state law permitted a
plaintiff who did not own shares at the time of the injury to bring suit,
there was a direct conflict and the district court applied the federal rule.
The instant court did not mention these cases but relied on the language
of the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.8 There the
state and federal "time of ownership" provisions were substantially the
same; the question was whether Federal Rule 23(b) preempted all state
requirements for bringing a derivative suit. The Court held that it did
not, and allowed the state "security for costs or minimum amount" statute
to be applied concurrently with the federal rule since the two were not in
conflict. The Court stated:
"Rule 23 requires the stockholder's complaint . . . to show
that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of
which he complains. . .. In other words, the federal court will
not permit itself to be used to litigate a purchased grievance or become
a party to speculation in wrongs done to corporations. . . . [Rule
23 does not] conflict with the [state] statute in question and all may
be observed by a federal court. ." 9
In Fuller v. American Machine & Foundry Co.,10 on facts essentially the
same as in the instant case, the court interpreted Cohen as compelling the
application of all state requirements for derivative suits, and therefore ap-
plied the same New York "time of ownership" rule that was rejected in the
instant decision. The Kaufman court instead construed Cohen's language
to speculate on the effect of the law suit on the market value of the shares. See also
Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 294 N.Y. 180, 61 N.E.2d 435 (1945).
In the instant case plaintiff began suit with less than the statutory minimum, and
when asked to comply with § 61-b attempted to do so by joining additional share-
holders rather than by posting security. According to the Noel case this would not
be permissible; the court stated, that if the plaintiff or plaintiffs did not have the
minimum number of shares at the time suit was brought, security would have to be
posted. Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 658, 53 N.Y.S2d 143, 153 (Sup. Ct.
1944). There is no evidence in the instant decision that defendant advanced this
argument.
6. 120 F2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941). See also Erie R.RL v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
7. 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944).
8. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
9. 337 U.S. at 556.
10. 95 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See note 5 supra.
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to require the application of the federal "time of ownership" provision in
all diversity cases.
From the Supreme Court's language it appears that the import
of Cohen was the Court's intention that the policy of Federal Rule
23(b) against litigation of purchased grievances 11 be carried out by the
federal courts. Kaufman's interpretation of Cohen to require the appli-
cation of the federal provision in the case of a conflict therefore seems
proper. However, construction of Federal Rule 23(b) as forbidding
joinder of subsequent shareholders is subject to question.' 2 Doubtlessly
the instant decision advances the policy against "purchased grievances,"
but the court may have lost sight of the more fundamental policy of allow-
ing derivative suits as a check on the transgressions of corporate manage-
ment.' 8 Rigid application of the "time of ownership" requirement together
with the state "minimum amount" provision places a difficult and perhaps
impossible burden on an otherwise qualified shareholder who desires to
institute a derivative suit."4 The only way he can satisfy the "minimum
amount" requirement is to join persons who held stock at the time of the
injury and retained it until time of the suit; such persons, if they exist
and can be identified, may very likely be limited in number because of the
turnover in shares. At the same time, the danger that subsequent share-
holders may have purchased their grievances does not seem sufficiently
great to risk preclusion of a derivative suit by a person who held his shares
at the time of the injury and thus has a proper interest within the policy
of 23(b). The policy against purchased grievances is largely met so
long as some of the plaintiffs were prior shareholders, since a minimum
degree of responsibility for avoidance of totally spurious claims is thereby
maintained and a sufficiently determined subsequent manipulator can,
by backing a "tame" shareholder, evade even the stricter rule. The instant
court should have construed Federal Rule 23(b) to allow joinder of
shareholders who did not own their shares at the time of the injury to
meet the state "minimum amount" requirement.'5
11. See Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 651, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143, 149
(Sup. Ct 1944).
12. No prior federal court has considered whether Federal Rule 23(b) when ap-
plied in conjunction with a state "minimum amount" requirement should be modified to
allow subsequent shareholders to be parties, with the exception of Fuller, see text at
note 10 supra, and that case avoided the problem by applying state law. The most
analogous case is Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 101 F. Supp. 549 (W.D.
Pa. 1951), where there was no problem of a state "minimum amount" requirement
but persons who did not own shares at the time of the injury were not allowed to
intervene in a suit begun by a qualified shareholder.
13. See BALLANTiNE, CO0poRATIO s 334 (rev. ed. 1948).
14. § 61-b, even without the additional restriction imposed by the instant case, has
been sfrongly criticized for its limitations on the institution of derivative suits. See
Hornstein, The Death Knell of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32
CALIF. L. Rav. 123 (1944); Notes, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 267 (1952); 23 ST. JoEN's L.
Rav. 296 (1949).
15. Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 101 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Pa. 1951),
see note 12 supra, can be distinguished, for without a "minimum amount" requirement,
intervention is not necessary to insure that an injury will be redressed.
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Criminal Procedure-
WHETHER AN ACCUSED IS "FLEEING FROM JUSTICE"
SO AS TO TOLL THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
DEPENDS UPON HIS INTENT AND IS A
QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY
More than three years after his alleged commission of a felony, de-
fendant was indicted therefor. During the interim defendant had been
absent from the jurisdiction for business reasons. Defendant's motion to
dismiss the indictment as barred by the statute of limitations ' was denied
by the district court on the ground that, as a matter of law and regardless of
defendant's intent, defendant's absence from the jurisdiction constituted
"fleeing from justice" so as to toll the statute.2 On appeal from defendant's
subsequent conviction, the court of appeals reversed, holding that whether
there had been a flight from justice depended upon defendant's leaving the
jurisdiction with intent to avoid prosecution, and this was a question of fact
for the jury. Donnell v. United States, 229 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1956).
The federal courts have disagreed on the construction of "fleeing from
justice" in the tolling provision of the statute of limitations. The prevail-
ing line of authority holds that any absence from the jurisdiction, regard-
less of intent, tolls the statute.3 A few decisions, followed by the majority
in the instant case, hold that the phrase means leaving one's usual place
of abode and concealing oneself either inside or outside of the jurisdiction
for the purpose of avoiding prosecution, and the jury must decide whether
such intent existed.4 This divergence apparently has its source in three
early Supreme Court cases, in the first two of which intent was not
in issue, where the Court used interchangeably the concepts of "fugitive
from justice" in the extradition statute 5 and "fleeing from justice" in the
tolling provision.6  In the first, Roberts v. Reilly,7 an extradition case,
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1952).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1952) reads: "No statute of limitations shall extend to any
person fleeing from justice."
3. Green v. United States, 188 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 955
(1951); King v. United States, 144 F2d 739 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 854
(1944); McGowen v. United States, 105 F2d 791 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
552 (1939). Compare McGowen v. United States, supra, wuith United States v.
Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 164 U.S. 46 (1896).1 4. Brouse v. United States, 68 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1933); Ferebee v. United
States, 295 Fed. 850 (4th Cir. 1924); Greene v. United States, 154 Fed. 401 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 207 U.S. 596 (1907); Porter v. United States, 91 Fed. 494 (5th
Cir. 1898).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1952) states:
"Whenever the executive authority of any State or territory demands any
person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District
or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment
found . . . certified as authentic . . . the executive authority . . . to which
such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, . . . and shall
cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent [of the requesting executive]
when he shall appear ..
6. See note 2 rsupra.
7. 116 U.S. 80 (1885).
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defendant contended that he could not be a "fugitive from justice" because
he had left the jurisdiction before an indictment was found. The Supreme
Court held:
"To be a fugitive from justice, in the sense of the act of Congress
regulating the subject under consideration, it is not necessary that the
party charged should have left the state in which the crime is alleged
to have been committed, after an indictment is found or for the purpose
of avoiding prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that having
within the state committed that which by its laws constitutes a crime,
when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process to answer
for his offense, he has left its jurisdiction and is found within the
jurisdiction of another." 8
In Streep v. United States,9 a case concerning the statute of limitations,
defendant similarly contended that since he had left the jurisdiction before
the federal indictment had been found, he could not be "fleeing from
justice" so as to toll the statute.10 The Court stated:
"In order to constitute a fleeing from justice [for the purpose
of the tolling provision] . . . it is not necessary that the course of
justice should have been put in operation by the presentment of an
indictment by the grand jury, or by the filing of an information by the
attorney for the government, or by the making of a complaint before
a magistrate. It is sufficient that there is a flight with the intention
of avoiding being prosecuted, whether the prosecution has or has not
actually begun . . . and there can be no doubt that in this respect
. . [the tolling provision] must receive the same construction that
has been given [the extradition provision] . . . by this court.
The Court then repeated the language of the Roberts case quoted supra.
Though Streep held only that a flight to avoid prosecution was enough
to toll the statute whether or not prosecution had begun, -the Court, by
including a reference to intent and adding that "in this respect" the
tolling provision should have the same interpretation as the extradition
statute, created an ambiguity. Apparently the Court intended the phrase
"in this respect" to limit the similarity of the two statutes to the issue
of whether the institution of prosecution was relevant to the application
of the statutes. However, in a subsequent extradition case, Appleyard
v. Massachusetts,s defendant, who had left the jurisdiction without know-
ing that he had committed a crime,13 argued that the Streep language
meant that the extradition and tolling statutes should have identical con-
8. Id. at 97.
9. 160 U.S. 128 (1895).
10. Id. at 134.
11. Id. at 133-34. (Emphasis added.)
12. 203 U.S. 222 (1906).
13. Id. at 226.
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structions not only as to the institution of prosecution but also as to intent.14
The Court held the reason for defendant's absence irrelevant under the ex-
tradition statute, but then, ignoring both the limited question to which
the Streep holding applied and Streep-s reference to the requirement of
intent, concluded:
"Interpreting the words 'fleeing from justice' as found in [the
tolling] section, the court [in Streep] expressly held that these words
must receive the same construction as was given in Roberts v. Reilly
to like words in [the extradition] section . . . , the inquiry in that
case being whether the accused was a fugitive from justice." 15
Lower courts have since seized on this language to support the con-
clusion that intent is immaterial not only in the extradition statute but
also in the tolling provision. 6
The statute of limitations and the extradition statute serve different
purposes. Extradition is a procedural mechanism designed to return for
trial in the jurisdiction where an offense was committed an accused against
whom proceedings have been taken.17 The reasons for an accused's being
absent are immaterial for this purpose. The statute of limitations, on the
other hand, gives effect to the policy judgment that an accused should not
be forced to stand trial a long period of time after the alleged commission
of a crime because crucial witnesses may disappear and testimony will be
less reliable.' 8 Although an accused may be indicted without being pres-
ent,' 9 the tolling provision reflects the further judgment of Congress that
the benefit of the statute of limitations should not be given to an accused
who by his own conduct delays prosecution.20 This seems justified because
by making himself difficult to locate the accused increases the burden on the
police and his unavailability for questioning may delay the finding of an
indictment.5 ' As long as the accused is purposely avoiding prosecution by
altering his normal pattern of behavior, it is immaterial whether he conceals
himself in another part of the jurisdiction-perhaps in the same large city-
or leaves the jurisdiction. In either case he is intentionally impeding the
14. Id. at 229.
15. Id. at 229-30.
16. See cases cited in note 3 supra. In McGowen v. United States, 105 F2d 791,
792 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 854 (1944), the court noted that the view
that intent is not relevant in "fleeing from justice" originated in an extradition case.
17. See note 5 supra. This section enforces U.S. CoNsr. art. IV, § 2.
18. See Note, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv. 630, 632 (1954). See also United States v.
Eliopoulos, 45 F. Supp. 777, 781 (D.N.J. 1942).
19. See FED. R. Cams. P. 6(d).
20. Though the policy of the statute of limitations is directed to assist an accused
at the trial stage, the statute is satisfied by the finding of an indictment or informa-
ion. However, a speedy trial after an indictment or information is required by
U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2. See also Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 633 & nn.18-21
(1954).
21. A would-be accused may be called by the prosecutor to appear before a grand
jury and may not claim a privilege to stay off the stand. However, as a witness, he
may claim the privilege against self-incrimination. McCoRmicy, EVIDENcE 257, 258-59
& n.10 (1954). On the other hand, the accused has no right to appear before the grand
jury. Duke v. United States, 90 F.2d 840 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 685 (1937).
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process of law enforcement. However, law enforcement would prob-
ably not be substantially affected if the accused left the jurisdiction for
some purpose other than to avoid prosecution, for most likely he would
be traceable through friends or the local post office. Even if leaving the
jurisdiction would have some adverse effect, it would be an unfair restric-
tion on personal mobility to withhold the protection of the statute from one
who had left the jurisdiction for a legitimate purpose.2 The instant court's
requirement of intent under the tolling provision therefore reaches a result
which gives effect to the policy of the tolling provision and is consistent
with a careful reading of the early Supreme Court cases, and a careful
distinction of the extradition statute should be recognized by other circuits.
Eminent Domain-
CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY FOR LEASE OF
PARKING FACILITIES TO PRIVATE OPERATORS IS
FOR PUBLIC USE DESPITE PRECLUSION OF STATE
CONTROL OVER PARKING RATES
The Indianapolis Off-street Parking Commission was empowered by
a state statute to condemn property for lease to private parking-lot opera-
tors.' However, the statute specifically withheld from the Commission
power to control the parking rates to be charged the public by the private
operators.2 Owners of real estate subject to condemnation proceedings
pursuant to the statute sought a declaratory judgment that the statute
was unconstitutional on the ground that lack of power in the commission
to control parking rates rendered the use of the anticipated acquisitions
private rather than public. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the statute on the theory that the condemnation would be
for a public use notwithstanding preclusion of rate regulation,3 since
operators of parking facilities would be subject to a privately enforceable
Another example of penalizing an accused who attempts to avoid prosecution is
the evidentiary rule permitting flight to be used against an accused at trial as evidence
of guilt. CLARK, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 600 (Mikell ed. 1918).
22. Once an accused is located there is no problem in making him available for
questioning if he is still within the jurisdiction of the United States, for a subpoena
to appear before a federal grand jury may be served anywhere within the national juiris-
diction, FED. R. CRim. P. 17(e) (1) ; if the accused refuses to honor the subpoena he
can be punished for contempt, FED. R. CRim. P. 17(g). If the accused were found to
be outside the jurisdiction of the United States, his availability would depend on the
extradition arrangement with the particular country. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(e) (1). If
he is in a place where extradition does not make him available, it would seem that he
should get the benefit of the statute as long as it could be determined that he had left
without intent to avoid prosecution. Cf. United States v. Hewecker, 79 Fed. 59 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 164 U.S. 46 (1896).
1. IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 48-8421 to 43 (Bums 1950), as amended, § 48-8430
(Supp. 1955). .
2. Id. at § 48-8430(d) (Supp. 1955).
3. The court was willing to assume, arguendo, that the statute precluded not
only rate regulations initiated by the commission but also by the state. Instant case
at 655-57.
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common-law duty to serve the public at reasonable rates.4  Foltz v. In-
dianapolis, 130 N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 1955).
It is universally established that private property cannot constitution-
ally be taken by eminent domain except for "public use." 
5 Courts occa-
sionally have given public use a narrow construction by requiring that
property taken by eminent domain be available to all members of the public
equally.6 However, courts reviewing projects to condemn land for privately
operated off-street parking have rejected this view, permitting special
benefit to private lessees provided the plan is "primarily" for a public
purpose.7  In San Francisco v. Ross,8 the only prior case where the res-
ervation of rate control was an issue, the California court held that leasing
a municipal parking facility without explicit reservation of municipal rate
control rendered the use private, even though reasonable rates might have
been enforced under regulations applicable to off-street parking operators
generally. The court, however, failed to indicate why special controls
were necessary to satisfy the constitutional requirement; nor have any
other cases involving comparable plans articulated a formula for deter-
mining when the public interest outweighs the private one. In the closely
analogous area of slum clearance and housing redevelopment,
9 recent cases
have followed a similar concept of public use, holding that if property is
condemned for a public purpose the fact that redevelopment is to be im-
plemented under private ownership does not necessarily make the use
other than public.10 However, most courts dealing with housing appear
to have demanded, first, that to justify condemnation the public need must
be stronger than that necessary to justify regulatory governmental actions
4. Id. at 655-57, 659.
5. See, e.g., Cole v. La Grange, 113 U.S. 1 (1884); Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79
(1884); cases collected in 2 NIcHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN 418-22 n.1 (3d ed. 1950).
The public use requirement has been implied from the provision in the fifth amendment
that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation,"
and from similar provisions in state constitutions. E.g., North Carolina Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Southern Power Co., 282 Fed. 837 (4th Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 508
(1923) ; Embury v. Conner, 3 N.Y. 511 (1850) ; see also cases cited in 2 NIcHoLs op.
cit. supra at 426 n.7. It has also been suggested that the public use requirement is
grounded in due process. E.g., Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853) ; Taylor V. Porter,
4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843). In applying this limitation to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, the Supreme Court seems always to defer to state characterizations
of public use. Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908) (dictum).
6. Many courts have at some time stated their acceptance of this view, e.g., West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848); Ross v. Davis, 97 Ind. 79
(1884) ; however, its history has been one of sporadic application followed by gradual
decline. See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.L.
REv. 615 (1940).
7. See San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal. 2d 52, 270 P.2d 488 (1955); Barnes v.
New Haven, 140 Conn. 8, 98 A.2d 523 (1953) ; Poole v. Kankakee, 406 Ill. 521, 94
N.E.2d 416 (1950); Denihan Enterprises v. O'Dwyer, 302 N.Y. 451, 99 N.E.2fd
235 (1951) ; cf. Gate City Garage v. Jacksonville, 66 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 1953).
8. 44 Cal. 2d 52, 270 P.2d 488 (1955).
9. The instant court rejected this analogy, instant case at 655, relying on sug-
gestions that clearance alone, by eliminating present blight, confers a sufficient benefit
to justify use of eminent domain so that subsequent disposition and use of cleared
land need not be considered in evaluating redevelopment programs. E.g., People
ex rel. Tuohy v. Chicago, 394 Ill. 477, 485-86, 68 N.E2d 761, 766 (1946) (dictum) ;
Papadinis v. Somerville, 331 Mass. 627,632, 121 N.E.2d 714, 717 (1954) (dictum).
10. E.g., Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App. 2d 777, 803, 266 P.2d
105, 122 (1954) ; People v. Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 611, 111 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1953).
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affecting private property,'1 and, second, that private ownership be sub-
ject to government controls sufficient to insure realization of the anticipated
public benefit's Thus, nearly all courts reviewing plans for redevelop-
ment of blighted areas have approved plans anticipating private control
of the property taken by condemnation, but only after noting that the
problem of urban blight is a particularly significant one, and that the private
operation is pursuant to a plan designed to prevent the r&urn of blight.'s
The purpose of off-street parking plans is to relieve traffic congestion
in streets not capable of accommodating present traffic loads.14 Using the
formula suggested by the redevelopment cases, it would appear that the
importance of the public traffic problem justifies exercise of eminent domain
even though .there is private gain implicit in the plan, unless lack of control
over rates charged by the private operators may be expected to frustrate
realization of the anticipated traffic relief. While the goal of the instant
statute is to draw the maximum volume of cars off the streets,15 the goal
of parking operators is to get maximum profit through the optimum com-
bination of both rates and volume. Thus, it may be desirable from the
operator's standpoint to run his facility below physical capacity by charging
a rate per vehicle substantially higher than the rate which would fill the
facility; or he may design his rate structure to encourage all-day storage
and discourage short-term parking, instead of inducing all-day parkers
to change to public transportation.16  It is apparent that the operator, in
fulfilling his profit goal, might not satisfy the primary public object of
getting the most cars off the streets. Accordingly, absence of government
control over rates may in fact substantially prevent realization of that
quantum of public benefit which the court requires. The instant court
felt that the privately enforceable common-law duty to charge reasonable
rates would be an adequate substitute for state regulation,17 but it is doubt-
11. E.g., Belovsky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 337, 54 A2d 277,
282 (1947) (condemnation not valid when blighted condition can be remedied by
regulatory processes) (dictum). But cf. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954)
(dictum); New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 341, 1 N.E.2d
153, 155 (1936) (dictum). For an examination of substantive due process and state
regulations, see Note, 53 CoLtm. L. REv. 827 (1953).
12. See note 10 supra. But cf. note 9 supra.
13. See, e.g., Gohold Realty Co. v. Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 138, 104 A.2d 365,
369 (1954) ; Velishka v. Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 165, 106 A.2d 571, 574 (1954).
14. EN o FOUNDATION, PARKING 33-35 (1956).
15. IN. AwN. STAT. § 48-8422 (Bums 1950).
16. Levin, Parking Facilities as Public Utilities, 29 CmI-KENT L. Rxv. 295, 311
(1951).
17. The court appeared to regard the public interest in parking facilities which
serve the general public as so acute that the imposition of a duty on their operators
to charge reasonable rates would be warranted. The court relied not only on
relatively recent cases involving water and gas suppliers, but also older authorities
concerning millers, ferrymen, and warehousemen. Instant case at 656. The court's
approach is not inconsistent with that formerly taken by the common law to de-
termine which kinds of enterprises ought to be subject to duties of fair service.
E.g., Allnut v. Inglis, 12 East 527, 134 Eng. Rep. 616 (K.B. 1810) ; cases collected
in Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARv. L. REv. 135 (1914); cases collected
in Arterburn, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV.
411 (1927). The court's approach is, however, inconsistent with that of more
recent cases which pass to the legislature the function of determining when a class
of enterprises is so "affected with a public interest" as to warrant public regula-
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ful if this remedy alone will achieve the desired result. In the first place,
consumer initiative to bring suit because of high rates is not likely in view
of the disparity between the small cost of a parking space and the high cost
of litigation. Secondly, even if suit is brought, judicial inquiry into the
fairness of utility rates seems, at common law, to have been limited to
determining whether the enterprise is obtaining a reasonable return on its
capital investment, without regard to efficiency or character of service.18
Inquiry thus limited promises little protection for the goals of the statute
against an operator who is content to maximize rates and minimize vol-
ume °.9 It appears, therefore, that a plan for rate control capable of in-
suring optimum relief of traffic congestion should have been a mandatory
part of a constitutionally valid off-street parking program.
Fire Insurance-
RECOVERY FOR FIRE OCCURRING AFTER SHERIFF'S
SALE BUT BEFORE FINAL PAYMENT LIMITED TO
AMOUNT OF FIRE LOSS AND PRORATED
BETWEEN INSURERS
Tax delinquent owned certain property which she had insured against
fire loss to the extent of $3,500. Failure to maintain tax payments resulted
in a sheriff's sale'L of the property to vendee for $2,600. After vendee
had made a down payment, obtained an additional $2,500 fire insurance
coverage of the premises and taken possession, the property incurred a
fire loss stipulated at $3,175. Shortly thereafter, vendee paid the balance
due on his bid 2 The two insurance companies then sought a declaratory
judgment to determine the respective rights and obligations of all parties
tion, a tendency suggested by the apparent absence within the past half century
of any extension of common-law duties to businesses not previously covered. The
instant court's departure from the recent trend is particularly striking since no
legislature in any jurisdiction has to date chosen to regulate parking rates of
private operators where there has been no condemnation, ENO FOUNDATION, PARK-
ING 188 (1956), and since some doubt exists whether such regulations would be
upheld as constitutional by most state courts, Levin, supra note 16.
18. E.g., Griffin v. Goldsboro Water Co., 122 N.C. 206, 30 S.E. 319 (1898);
K.B. ANCIENT INDICTMENTS 38 (1354), reprinted in BLAND, BRowN & TAWNEY,
ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY SELECT DOCUMENTS 169 (1919).
19. It would probably not be desirable to enlarge this scope of inquiry, since
the judiciary and the judicial method are not well adapted to making decisions in
the detailed regulation of business enterprises. Cf. BARNES, ECONOMICs OF UTnIr
REGULArION 170 (1942). Administrative regulation, on the other hand, has been
characterized by the exercise of broad discretion in adjusting rates according to the
administrator's view of a company's efficiency and character of service. See cases
collected in NICHOLS, RATE OF RETURN 382-407 (1955).
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §4981 (Purdon 1931).
2. Under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §2052 (Purdon 1931), the tax delinquent re-
tained an equity of redemption in the property for one year from the date of ac-
knowledgment of the sheriff's deed. However, the delinquent's equity expired prior
to the instant decision, since the one-year period had elapsed; as a result, the court
refused to evaluate the equity in its allocation of proceeds. But cf. Perkins v. Cen-
tury Ins. Co., 303 Mich. 679, 7 N.W.2d 106 (1942).
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concerned. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that vendee was entitled
to full recovery to the extent of the fire loss, and that the responsibilities of
the insurers would be apportioned according to the pro rata clause 3 of each
policy. The court directed vendor's 4 insurer to pay the full amount of
the fire loss to vendor in trust for vendee.5 Vendee's insurer was required
to indemnify vendor's insurer to the extent of the former's pro rata share.
Insurance Co. v. Alberstadt, 383 Pa. 556, 119 A.2d 83 (1956).
In order to obtain recovery on a fire insurance policy, the insured must
have an insurable interest 6 in the property at the time of the loss. 7 After
execution of a contract to sell realty, but before final payment and transfer
of deed, both vendee 8 and vendor 9 have insurable interests in the same
res. Where during this period a fire occurs and the vendor is insured, a
problem arises as to the disposition of the proceeds of the policy. If the
vendor were allowed to keep his insurance proceeds plus the balance due
from the vendee on the contract of sale, he would profit from the fire,
although the insurer would merely be paying for the risk it contracted to
assume. On the other hand, if the vendor collected no insurance, or if
the insurer paid the vendor but then became subrogated to the latter's
3. The critical portion of the standard pro rata liability clause is as follows: "This
company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss . .. than (1) the
amount of insurance under this policy bears to the whole amount of fire insurance
covering the property ... " Record, pp. 11a, 18a. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§657 (Purdon 1954).
4. "Vendor," as used herein, refers to the tax delinquent, not to the sheriff who
actually made the sale in the instant case.
5. Vendor's attorney demanded full payment by vendor's insurer to vendor, in
accordance with the language of the decree directing payment to vendor in trust for
vendee. Both insurers protested. Vendee's insurer had advanced vendee $2,500 as a
loan to rebuild the damaged structure, and wanted to cancel vendee's loan, pay vendee
the remainder due for the loss and seek pro rata indemnification from vendor's
insurer. The case was finally settled when the insurers obtained a release from
vendor in return for payment of vendor's litigation costs. Interview with counsel
for Insurance Co. of North America, vendee's insurer, March 7, 1956.
Directing payment to vendor seems illogical, for a trust is normally constructed
to obtain payment from the "trustee." The court recognized the fictitious nature of
a constructive trust in Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co., 361 Pa. 68, 86 n.4, 63 A.2d
85, 99 n.4 (1949), but molded a similar decree in that case. More significantly, if
the decree had been followed literally in the instant case, an adjustment would have
been highly circuitous. If the pro rata clause were properly applied, each insurer
should have been required to pay its pro rata share of the loss directly to the vendee.
6. Moving Picture Co. v.,Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 358, 90 At.
642 (1914) ; Sweeny v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 20 Pa. 337 (1853). The doctrine of
"indemnity" originally referred to the requirement that each insured have an insur-
able interest in the property insured. See McClain, Insurance of Limited Interests
Against Fire, 11 HARv. L. Rav. 512, 523 (1898). The purposes of this requisite have
been listed as threefold: ". . . (a) measurement of the insured's loss; (b) pre-
vention of wagering; (c) safeguarding the moral hazard." PATTERSON, ESSENTLALS OF
INSURANcE LAW § 22 (1935). For a list of the types of interests which are insurable,
see id. § 23.
- 7. Id. §29.
8. Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Martin, 40 N.J.L. 568 (1878); Millville Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Wilgus, 88 Pa. 107 (1878) ; 4 APPLEAN, INSwJRANcE LAW AND PRAcriCE
§ 2182 (1941). See McClain, supra note 6, at 517.9. Heidisch v. Globe and Republic Ins. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 A2d 566 (1951);
Hill v. Cumberland Valley Mut. Protection Co., 59 Pa. 474 (1868) ; State Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513 (1853) ; 4 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAC-
TIcE § 2181 (1941) ; 1 MAY, INsURA cE § 83a (4th ed. 1900).
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rights to the balance due from the vendee,10 the insurer would obtain a
windfall."1 Where the vendee is uninsured, this dilemma is avoided by
the doctrine of "equitable conversion," which requires vendor to transfer
all insurance proceeds to the uninsured vendee who has perfected his
title.12 In Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co.,1' the court extended this
doctrine to allow an insured vendee recovery on vendor's policy even
though vendee had already been partially reimbursed on his own policy.
Vendee voluntarily limited his total claim from all insurers to the amount
of the fire loss, and was awarded the pro rata share which he sought from
vendor's insurer.14  In Vogel v. Northern Assurance Co.,15 where both
vendee and vendor were insured, the Third Circuit ruled that under
Pennsylvania law, as reflected in Dubin, the vendee could recover up to
the full amount of the fire loss from his policy and also from the vendor's,
even though the vendee would thus recover considerably more than the
total fire loss. In the instant case, as in Dubin and Vogel, "equitable con-
version" allowed the insured vendee to recover on the prior owner's insur-
ance policy.'" However, by limiting total recovery to the amount of the
fire loss, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court achieved a result opposite to that
obtained by the federal court in Vogel. The instant court's rationale
10. See, e.g., Castellain v. Preston, 11 Q.B.D. 380 (C.A. 1883).
11. See Godfrey, Some Limited-Interest Problems, 15 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
415, 419-20 (1950) ; Vanneman, Risk of Loss in Equity, Between Date of Contract To
Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 MINN. L. Rxv. 127, 138 (1924).
12. Brady v. Welsh, 200 Iowa 44, 204 N.W. 235 (1925); Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa.
200 (1863) ; Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 GEo. 5, c. 20, § 47. Contra, Rayner v.
Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1 (C.A. 1881); Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N.Y. 369,
146 N.E. 630 (1925) (dictum).
13. 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949), 98 U. PA. L. REv. 766 (1950).
14. At a settlement conference prior to this suit all insurers agreed to pay pro
rata shares of the loss. However, the court did not limit its holding to an enforcement
of the settlement agreement. Id. at 75, 63 A.2d at 89.
15. 219 F2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955). For a critique of the district court decision in
Vogel, 114 F. Supp. 591 (E.D. Pa. 1953), see Note, 40 VA. L. R.zv. 917 (1954);
102 U. PA. L. Rrv. 677 (1954).
16. "Equitable conversion" has been justified as fulfilling the layman's expectation
that vendor's insurance will run with the land, see Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1, 15
(C.A. 1881) (James, L.J., dissenting), and as effecting the intention of vendor and
his insurer that the policy embrace vendee's interests as well as vendor's, see Dubin
Paper Co. v. Insurance Co., 361 Pa. 68, 80, 63 A.2d 85, 92 (1949) (coverage in-
creased after signing contract of sale) ; State Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa.
513, 520-21 (1853) (policy obtained after signing contract of sale). Both reasons
seem inapplicable to the instant situation. Here the vendee thinks only of receiving
title from the sheriff, not from an unseen tax delinquent, and failure of the prior
owner to reduce coverage and to ask for return of part of a $12.75 premium does
not present a rational basis for inferring that both vendor and his insurer intended to
benefit an unknown purchaser at a forced tax sale. However, once the court is willing
to apply "equitable conversion" where the vendee is insured in an amount equal to
the purchase price, as it did in Dubin, it is not surprising that the instant court ex-
tended the principle to a sheriff's sale situation in which both vendee and the prior
owner were insured. Support may be found in the present English statute, which
explicitly extends operation of "equitable conversion" to the sheriff's sale situation.
Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 Guo. 5, c. 20, § 47(3).
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was the common-law doctrine of indemnity. 1 . This doctrine has long been
utilized to deter arson and negligence by limiting recovery to the "loss"
sustained.' 8 The "loss" to be indemnified has been defined in Pennsylvania
as the "fire-created depletion of insured's assets"; 19 only a few courts 
20
and no Pennsylvania courts 21 have ever required payment in excess of
that amount. Although "equitable conversion!' had been applied in pre-
vious cases in such sweeping terms that one commentator called the Vogel
result of double recovery "inevitable," 22 the instant court apparently re-
fused to be coerced by a compelling trend of doctrine, and prevented an
increased moral hazard by limiting recovery to the amount of the physical
loss.m Furthermore, the insurers retained all premiums. Though reten-
tion of full premiums may be justified where the contract of sale is "volun-
tary," making a joint policy feasible,24 it seems inequitable under the
17. Instant case at 562, 119 A.2d at 86. Other doctrinal bases for so limiting
recovery might be the placing of all risk of loss on vendor, thus eliminating the
second insurable interest, see UNrFoRm VENDOR AND PURCHAsER RISK AcT; Vanneman,
supra note 11, at 142-43, or the recognition and application of a clause contained in
each policy which limits recovery to the value of the respective insurable interest, see
Brief for Appellants, pp. 7, 9. The insertion of this clause is required by statute.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 657 (Purdon Supp. 1953). The first alternative, however,
would require the discarding of over a century of Pennsylvania case law placing risk
of loss on vendee. See, e.g., Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co., sipra note 16; State
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Updegraff, supra note 16. The second alternative was ignored
by the court, perhaps because it thought that premiums were calculated according to
the risk of the whole property burning, and not on the basis of vendor's insurable
interest in the property, or that vendee's interest may be included by representation in
vendor's recovery, or even that the legislature could not have intended so sweeping a
change. See Godfrey, supra note 11, at 420-21. In Heidisch v. Globe and Republic
Inc. Co., 368 Pa. 602, 84 A.2d 566 (1951), the court had permitted payment to the
insured in excess of an award previously made in condemnation proceedings.
18. See McClain, supra note 6, at 523.
19. Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co., 361 Pa. 68, 91, 63 A.2d 85, 96 (1949).
20. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 205 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
(partnership interests).
21. The only Pennsylvania case in which total recovery has been sought in excess
of the fire loss involved a combination of policies insuring mortgagor and mortgagee.
Dunsmore v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 86, 149 Atl. 163 (1930).
22. See Note, 40 VA. L. REV. 917, 933 (1954).
23. Even where recovery is limited to the amount of the physical loss, vendee
may make a profit from the fire if his purchase price was less than the loss. Such
a gain may be in conflict with a strict rule of indemnity, but was accepted by the
court in Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co., 361 Pa. 68, 63 A.2d 85 (1949).
24. At first glance, a refund of the portion of the premiums covering the differ-
ence between a pro rata share and the total amount of the fire loss seems desirable.
In contrast to over-insurance of a sole interest by one person, both vendee and the
vendor have legitimate reasons for retaining full insurance until transfer of legal
title. Vendee normally bears full risk of loss, being bound to pay vendor the agreed
purchase price. The vendor, on the other hand, will want to insure against the chance
that the vendee will not be able to complete payment, in which case vendor would have
to retain the land in its devalued condition, with merely the hope of obtaining and
enforcing a judgment against the defaulting vendee. However, it is probably reason-
able to place the burden of obtaining a joint policy on vendee and vendor, see Note,
40 VA. L. Ray. 917, 934 (1954), rather than to require insurance companies to inform
themselves on the creation of separate insurable interests in the res of each insured,
see Reply Brief for Appellants, pp. 10-11.
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peculiar circumstances of the sheriff's sale, in which vendee has no contact
with the prior owner.23 However, failure of either vendor or vendee to
claim a refund rendered that problem moot in the instant case.2 6
Once total recovery has been determined, there remains the distribu-
tion of responsibility between the respective insurers. This could be done
by one of several methods: according to the value of the respective insur-
able interests; by full recovery from one policy with payment of any
remainder due from the second; or pro rata according to the face of each
policy. Precedent apparently foreclosed the first alternative,27 and the
second lacks a rational means for determining which policy should be
looked to first for full recovery. In the instant case, each policy contained
a standard pro rata liability clause, limiting the insurer's liability to a pro-
portion of the loss equal to that which the amount of the policy bears to the
total insurance on the property.28 The court chose this method for allocat-
ing the loss. Such clauses have been judically employed to apportion
liability between insurers only when the policies in question cover the
"csame property, the same risk and the same interest." 2 Clearly, the
property and the risk were the same in the instant case. In addition, since
vendee completed payment, and vendor allowed his equity of redemption
to expire, all benefits would clearly inure to the vendee through "equitable
conversion." Hence, the vendee's and vendor's separate insurable interests
were treated by the court as the same interest for this purpose 8 0 Thus,
although it was necessary to make a new application of the "same interest"
concept, the court achieved a satisfactory solution.3 '
25. At a sheriff's sale there is no normal opportunity for, nor thought of, bargain-
ing between prior owner and vendee. Vendee could determine if the prior owner had
retained his insurance, but no prudent purchaser would want to rely solely on the prior
owner's insurance.
26. Failure to assert a claim was due, no doubt, to the negligible premiums in-
volved. E.g., the former owner had paid $12.75 for a three-year coverage of $3,500.
Reply Brief for Appellants, p. 11.
27. See note 17 supra.
28. See note 3 supra. Prior to inclusion of the pro rata liability clause in the
standard fire insurance policy, an insured could sue any of his insurers for full recovery.
Then, that insurer would be forced to bring a second suit against the other insurer
for contribution. In any event, one person's total recovery was clearly limited to the
amount of the fire loss. The basic reason for the pro rata liability clause, then, was
to avoid the circuity of action involved in obtaining contribution, and was not neces-
sary to limit recovery to the fire loss. See 2 MAY, INSURANCE § 434 (4th ed. 1900);
VANCE, HANDBOOK ON TE LAW OF INSURANCE § 154 (3d ed. 1951).
29. Vrabel v. Scholler, 369 Pa. 235, 243, 85 A.2d 858, 862 (1952) ; Sloat v. Royal
Ins. Co., 49 Pa. 14, 18 (1864).
30. But see 3 RICHARDS, INSURANCE § 538 (5th ed. 1952), where it is said that,
for the pro rata liability clause to apply, "there must be two or more policies written
in the name of the same insured covering the same property."
31. One logical implication of a finding that the "same interest" is insured, in a
situation similar to that of the instant case, would be to allow an annexed clause con-
ditioning recovery on the absence of "other insurance" to render either vendee's or
vendor's policy voidable by the respective insurer once equitable conversion is per-
mitted. See VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 144 (3d ed. 1951).
1956]
1122 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104
The instant case does not raise the question of what would happen
if separate suits or a declaratory judgment were brought before vendee's
full payment and expiration of vendor's equity of redemption, or, in the
instant situation, if separate suits were brought by vendor and vendee.
No doubt the court would utilize the indemnity principle in each situation
to limit total recovery to the amount of the fire loss. However, appor-
tionment would remain a problem. If separate suits were brought in the
instant situation, liability should certainly be proratedpa The instant
court's theory for prorating liability should apply equally well where vendee
has not completed payment, for vendee will still receive the full benefit
of all insurance proceeds.U4 If vendor exercised his equity of redemption
or if it had not expired before the final decision in the instant situation,
the court may well require vendor's insurer to be fully liable to vendor for
the value of his equity,85 and then prorate the remainder among the
insurers.
Contra, Vogel v. Northern Assurance Co., 219 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1955). The de-
sirability of this result seems dubious, for vendee could not know whether such a
clause would be operative until after the fire occurs and equitable conversion is em-
ployed. Hence, it is important to restrict the present application of the "same inter-
est" doctrine to the purpose of proration in the instant situation.
32. Since Dunsmore v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 86, 149 AdU. 163 (1930),
involved separate suits on separate interests, and was cited by the instant court as
authority for so limiting total recovery, instant case at 560, 119 A.2d at 86, the instant
decision would probably be extended to cover the situation where vendee has not
completed payment prior to decision, even if vendee and vendor are then deemed to
have retained separate interests. Cf. Ramsdell v. Insurance Co., 197 Wis. 136, 221
N.W. 654 (1928). But cf. American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 205 S.W.2d 417
(Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
33. A procedural change should not substantially alter the measure of individual
liability or recovery established in the instant case. Perhaps the apparently strange
mode of relief granted in the instant case, see text at notes 3 and 4 supra, was intended
as a guide to proration in a future contribution suit brought by an insurer following
a separate judgment for vendee or vendor. The procedural posture of the instant
case can be closely approached, thereby avoiding such a problem, if vendee sues
both insurers jointly under Pa. R.C.P. No. 2229, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, app.
(Purdon 1951).
34. The major Pennsylvania cases were litigated after payment had been com-
pleted. However, vendee is entitled to an abatement of the remainder of the purchase
price due vendor, and payment from the vendor of any proceeds in excess thereof,
without senselessly going through the motions of first tendering payment to vendor.
"[T]he vendor is treated as a trustee for the purchaser.... It does not seem
to be necessary to produce this effect, that any part of the purchase-money should be
paid; it results from the contract." Siter, James & Co.'s Appeal, 26 Pa. 178, 180
(1856); see Ziegler v. Wright, 10 Northam. Law Rep. 178 (Northampton County,
Pa. C.P. 1906); Miller v. Hauck, 16 Mont Co. L.R. 40 (Montgomery County, Pa.
C.P. 1900); cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Dye, 22 Mo. App. 926, 20 S.W2d 946 (1929).
But see Rayner v. Preston, 18 Ch. D. 1, 13 (1881) (James, LJ., dissenting). The
procedural problem is similar to that existing after payment. See note 33 supra.
In' the sheriff's sale situation, if vendee had not completed payment, the proceeds for
the "trustee" should, and probably would, go to the sheriff, not to the tax delinquent
35. Cf. Perkins v. Century Ins. Co., 303 Mich. 679, 7 N.W2d 106 (1942)
(rejected limitation of award to merely nominal damages though fire occurred one
day prior to expiration of equity of redemption).
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Patents-
REQUIREMENT THAT USERS OF COMBINATION
PATENT PURCHASE COMPONENT PARTS FROM
PATENTEE HELD NO MISUSE
Patentee was in the business of marketing a thermal electric fuel sys-
tem 1 covered by its combination patent.2 Although patentee did not install
the system for its customers, it would design the system, furnish instructions
for installation, and guarantee its performance. Purchasers of the system
were required to buy the unpatented component parts from patentee. 8 The
seller of a similar type of system charged that the parts requirement con-
stituted patent misuse and sought a declaratory judgment that patentee
was not entitled to protection.4 The trial court found in the patentee's
favor 5 and the circuit court affirmed, holding that such a requirement did
not constitute patent misuse. Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems,
Inc., 231 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1956).
A patent is a legislative grant to a patentee of a right to exclude
others from using, selling, or installing the invention.0 Under the doctrine
of patent misuse, courts have refused patentees protection against infringe-
ment where the pateritee has used his patent to control the market in un-
patented articles.7 The doctrine is based on the theory that the legislature
did not intend the artificial monopoly of the patent to be extended beyond
the precise limits of the patent grant.8 In determining whether there has
been misuse, the courts have confined their inquiry to the question of
whether patentee's conduct would give him any control at all beyond the
scope of the patent, and have not been concerned with the extent or reason-
ableness of the additional control. 9 The courts have looked at the arrange-
1. The patent, the "Lines Thermal Electric System," is an arrangement for the
electrical preheating of viscous fuel oil while it is being transported from a storage
tank to an oil burner. See findings in the district court opinion in the instant case.
Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 123, 124 (D.C. Conn.
1955).
2. A "combination" patent is a composition of old or new elements which produces
a new and useful result. The result must be the product of the combination and not a
mere aggregation of several results. United States Industrial Chemical Co. v. Therog
Co., 25 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1928).
3. Where necessary, defendant also designed and modified the parts for the sys-
tem. Instant case at 372.
4. Plaintiff also claimed (1) that the patent was invalid and not infringed; (2)
damages and an injunction for defendant's violation of the antitrust laws; (3) dam-
ages and an injunction for defendant's acts of unfair competition. Defendant counter-
claimed for infringement. Electric Pipe Line, Inc. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., 132 F. Supp.
123 (D.C. Conn. 1955).
5. Ibid.
6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 271, 281 (1952). See generally VAUGHA N, THE UTnIE STATES
PATENT SYSTEM (1956).
7. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917);
Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Leitch
Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938); Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314
U.S. 488 (1942); Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
See Note, 50 COLUM. L. Rrv. 476 (1950).
8. Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
9. In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 117 F2d 968 (7th Cir. 1941), the circuit
court attempted to apply the "rule of reason" standard of § 3 of the Clayton Act, 38
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ment between the patentee and his licensees or customers to see if the sale
of the unpatented commodity was "tied-in" to the use of the patent,10 and
also at measures taken by the patentee directly affecting a competitor in
unpatented articles, such as suits for contributory infringement 11 or notice
to such competitor's customers that they may be liable for direct infringe-
ment.- 2 However, the 1952"Patent Act I's made it clear that it would not be
patent misuse merely to bring suit for contributory infringement or to sell
unpatented articles to users of the patent. In Mercoid v. Mid-Continent In-
Vestment Co.14 the Supreme Court for the first time applied the patent
misuse doctrine in a situation where the unpatented article was a component
part of a patented combination. In that case the combination patent covered
a domestic heating system comprised of a stoker, a switch and a thermostat.
An exclusive licensee of the patentee manufactured and sold the unpatented
switch and allowed purchasers to use the patented system; licensee's
revenue was derived solely from the sale of the switch, and patentee's
royalties depended on the number of switches sold rather than on use of the
system. In a suit by the patentee against a manufacturer who was selling
identical switches to persons not licensed to use the system, relief was denied
on the ground of patent misuse.'6 In the instant case, even though the
system could be purchased only if the purchaser obtained the unpatented
component parts from the patentee, and even though patentee's source of
revenue was the unpatented components and not the sale of the system
as such, the court held there was no patent misuse, distinguishing Mercoid
on the ground that the instant patentee did not merely sell parts but also
designed, inspected, and guaranteed the performance of the system.'6
According to the factors heretofore considered by the courts in deter-
mining patent misuse, it does not appear that the instant court's reason for
distinguishing Mercoid should lead to the conclusion that there was no
misuse. Unquestionably the arrangement between the patentee and the
customer was such that the customer could not use the system without
STAT. 738, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952), to the patent misuse doctrine. The Supreme Court
reversed, rejecting this approach in Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942). For a complete discussion and analysis of this aspect of the patent misuse
doctrine, see WooD, PATMTS AND ANTIrTUST LAW 63-95 (1942). Note that in Great
Lakes Equipment Co. v. Fluid Systems, Inc., 217 F.2d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 1954) it was
decided that the instant patentee was not violating the Clayton Act.
10. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
(purchase of' unpatented supplies was an express condition of the patent licensing
agreement); B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942) (use of patented
system automatically permitted to all purchasers of unpatented materials).
11. E.g., Lincoln Electric Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 171 F2d 223 (6th Cir.
1948).
12. E.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 43 F. Supp. 692 (N.D.
Ill.), iev'd, 133 F.2d 803 (7th Cir. 1942), rev'd, 320 U.S. 661 (1944); cf. Bechik
Products, Inc. *v. Flexible Products, Inc., 225 F2d 603 (1955) (good faith notifica-
tion not misuse).
13. 35 U.S.C. §271(d) (1952). See Federico, Commentary on the New Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 51-54 (1951) ; Note, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 909 (1953).
14. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
15. See Wood, The Tangle of Mercoid Case Implications, 13 Gao. WAsH. L. Rxv.
61 (1944); Note, 66 HA~v. L. Rxv. 909 (1953).
16. By thus distinguishing Mercoid the instant court avoided construing 35
US.C. § 271(d) (1952). See instant case at 372.
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buying the unpatented components from the patentee. This is sufficient to
establish that the patentee was using the patent to control the market of
unpatented articles.17 Nevertheless, the court seems to have ignored the
factor of control, introducing a new line of inquiry: whether the patentee
is contributing so much to the completed product and accepting such re-
sponsibility for it that he is, in effect, delivering a completed product. While
the relevance of such circumstances is not apparent in terms of the existing
patent misuse doctrine, there appears some basis for a related but more
extensive modification of the doctrine. Certain products covered by com-
bination patents and made up of unpatented components, such as radios and
appliances, are normally sold only as completed assemblies. Such sales
could well be construed as patent misuse, for the patentee would be keeping
users of the system from buying unpatented parts from others.'8 However,
no one has ever claimed that this would be misuse, no doubt because pur-
chasers of these products generally demand completed assemblies in order to
insure qualified installation, to obtain performance guarantees, and for con-
venience. This suggests that inquiry into misuse of a combination patent
might begin with a determination not of the form in which the patentee
tenders the product, but of the form in which the market demands it. The
existence of patent misuse would then depend upon exercise of control over
unpatented parts beyond that implicit in the expected market form. Al-
though the instant court, in considering the virtually assembled form in
which the product was sold, employed a novel factor for determining patent
misuse, it failed to develop this into what could be a more meaningful ap-
proach to misuse of combination patents. A thorough consideration of the
assembled or non-assembled form of the fuel system expected by the indus-
trial consumers in the instant case might have led to a different result.
Torts-
PROFESSIONAL BOXER WHO SOLD "MOTION PICTURE
RIGHTS" TO HIS PERFORMANCE WHEN COMMERCIAL
TELEVISION NON-EXISTENT CAN RECOVER ON
UNFAIR COMPETITION THEORY FOR LATER USE
OF FILM ON TELEVISION
Plaintiff prizefighter's 1936 boxing match with Joe Louis was filmed
with plaintiff's consent pursuant to a contract whereby he received a
stipulated price for the sale of his motion picture rights.' Thirteen years
later, the film was telecast as part of a series called "Greatest Fights of
the Century," whereupon plaintiff sued the program sponsor and the
17. See Mercoid v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Carbice
Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
18. Cf. 35 U.S.C. §271(d) (1952); Note, 66 HAv. L. REv. 909 (1953).
1. Though this contract is not available, it was stipulated that the plaintiff sold
the motion picture rights and received the contract price. Brief for Appellants,
app. p. 5a.
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television station for damages to his property rights.2 The federal district
court dismissed the action under Federal Rule 41(b) as showing no
right to relief.4  On appeal the Third Circuit reversed, holding that plain-
tiff had a property right in his performance, and that since commercial
television did not exist at the time of the fight, plaintiff had impliedly re-
served the use of the performance for that purpose; defendant's telecast
of the film constituted unfair competition as an invasion of plaintiff's right
to control the use of his performance.5 Ettore v. Philco Television Broad-
casting Co., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
The common law has long recognized and protected property rights
in productions of artistic and intellectual effort such as books or plays.6
The purpose of affording such protection is to encourage the utilization
of talent for the public benefit. 7  With the advent of the phonograph and
motion picture, similar rights were recognized in reproductions of per-
formances by actors and musicians.8 The law has further developed be-
yond its early criteria, recognizing property rights in photographs,9
cartoons,10 ticker tape quotations11 and even in a short musical laugh.
12
Although originality is still required, 13 it would appear existent whenever
the performance is identifiable as claimant's. The high commercial value
attached to athletic performances indicates that as much demand exists
for such talent as for that of other performers now protected. Thus, the
realistic policy adopted by the instant court under the euphemism "prop-
erty right" to protect any individual earning his livelihood by performances
for hire 14 appears justified.
The performer, however, may have assigned or released such rights
in whole or part to another.' 5 While such a release might be inferred
2. Plaintiff further alleged that his best round was omitted in the telecast, thereby
reflecting unfairly on his prowess. Instant case at 483. The district court held that
omission of the round constituted a proper method of editing, not amounting to
defamation. See Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 126 F. Supp. 143 (E.D.
Pa. 1954). The circuit court indicated that the omissions were de inininus. Instant
case at 496.
3. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b).
4. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Co., 126 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1954).
5. The court held that plaintiff had been damaged in all states where the telecast
had been received: Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey and Delaware. Instant
case at 489-95. The conflict of laws is not considered herein.
6. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912); see also AMDUR, COPYRIGHT LAw
AND PRAcrIcE 30-32 (1936) and cases cited therein.
7. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 CoLUIm. L. REV. 503, 506-08
(1945).
8. Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338 (E.D.N.C. 1939); see also Savage v.
Hoffman, 159 Fed. 584 (2d Cir. 1908).
9. Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 977 (W.D.N.Y. 1936), aff'd, 88
F2d 411 (2d Cir. 1937).
10. Detective Conics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y.
1939), tnodified on other grounds, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
11. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Christie Grain Co., 198 U.S. 236 (1905).
12. Blanc v. Lantz, 83 U.S.P.Q. 137 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1949).
13. See Burrows-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Victor
Talking Mach. Co. v. George, 69 F.2d 871 (3d Cir. 1934).
14. Instant case at 490.
15. Ordinarily the question is one primarily of contract construction. See, e.2.,
Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317 (1920); Republic Productions v. Rogers, 213 F.2d
662 (9th Cir. 1954); Wexley v. KTTV, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 558 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
aff'd, 220 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1955).
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from plaintiff's failure to inscribe on the instant film an express reserva-
tion of rights such as would effectively restrict use,18 the court felt that
fairness required a finding of implied reservation.17 This conclusion
appears doubtful, since prospective increases in the value of property
have traditionally inured to the purchaser's benefit. Much confusion
would result if, on the invention of new modes of holding property,
original parties were allowed to follow it into all hands however remote; 1S
a restriction by implication would create problems of acquiring releases
from performers whose contracts are lost or ambiguous, as well as uncer-
tainty among exhibitors as to exactly what rights they have acquired.19
In addition, restrictions in the nature of equitable servitudes upon chattels
which affect their marketability and hence alienability are generally frowned
upon.
Assuming, however, that the court reasoned correctly in holding
plaintiff to have reserved a property interest in the performance, there
remains the problem of an available theory of relief to warrant recovery
of damages. Where there has been an improper use of such a perform-
ance, relief has been granted on three different theories: invasion of
privacy,21 infringement of common law copyright 2 and unfair competi-
tion.23 The one most commonly employed in such cases is the developing
concept of unfair competition, recovery for which is based on detriment
to some commercial advantage of plaintiff arising from the failure of
defendant's business conduct to meet a certain ethical standard.2 4
Classically, the concept required that defendant be in direct competition
with plaintiff and that there be a "passing off" of defendant's goods as
16. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 194 At!. 631 (1937)
upholds the effectiveness of such a restriction. A contrary view was expressed by
Judge Learned Hand in RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940), but the case was subsequently overruled in Capital
Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir. 1955).
17. Instant case at 491.
18. See Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and
Chattels, 69 HAxv. L. Rxv. 1250, 1259 (1956).
19. Also, if the right of the performer survives his death, the necessity of locating
and persuading heirs or legatees will plague the exhibitors.
20. See Chafee, The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and
Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1250 (1956); Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels,
41 HARV. L. REv. 945, 983-87 (1928). Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327
Pa. 433, 194 AtI. 631 (1937) appears to be the first case to give explicit recognition to
such a servitude.
21. Sharkey v. NBC, 93 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
22. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 194 At. 631 (1937)
(alternative holding). This case demonstrates the courts' confusion in this area
of the concepts of common-law copyright, unfair competition and right of privacy.
23. Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols Recorder Corp., 279 Ajp.
Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (lst Dep't 1949); Waring v. Dunlea, 26 F. Supp. 338
(E.D.N.C. 1939) ; Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490
(W.D. Pa. 1938).
24. See 1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKS § 7 (2d ed. 1950);
Nims, TnE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADEmARxS § 3 (4th ed. 1947).
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those of plaintiff.25 In the landmark case of International News Service
v. Associated Press 2 unfair competition was extended to include misap-
propriation of another's work product for use in competition with him, the
Supreme Court enjoining a competing news service from distributing to
its own customers news gathered by plaintiff. Building on the INS de-
cision, later cases have allowed recovery for piratical conduct even where
competition is indirect. In Metropolitan Opera Assn v.'Wagner-Nichols
Recording Corp.,2 7 where an opera company licensed broadcasting and
recording rights for its performances, sale of records made by an un-
authorized interception of the broadcast was enjoined although defend-
ant's competition was with the licensee rather than directly with plaintiff
opera company 8 Until the instant case, the furthest advance in the un-
fair competition concept was in Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co.29
Despite the performer's express restriction against radio broadcast in-
scribed on phonograph records of his performances, a radio station played
such records in competition with another station which was paying the
performer to make live broadcasts. While direct competition did not
exist between defendant radio station and the performer, and the records
were available for public sale, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
defendant's use of the records constituted unfair competition. The instant
decision goes beyond even Waring. Here, since consent to take and
show the films had been acquired, there was no unauthorized interception
or appropriation as in Metropolitan Opera and INS. Furthermore, plain-
tiff being no longer actively engaged in prizefighting, there was no compe-
tition such as would dilute his prospective earnings as a performer,
whereas in Waring the unauthorized use reduced demand for Waring's
live performances.30 Nevertheless, in the instant case defendant's use did
compete with plaintiff's exercise of his allegedly reserved right to control
mse of his performance. If the basic policy of preserving for performers
the fruits of their efforts is to be realistically implemented, extension of
the unfair competition doctrine to guard against such a competing use
may be justified.3 1
Although not considered by the majority opinion, it was argued by
the dissent 32 that plaintiff had surrendered all rights in his performance
25. See 1 CALIMANN, op. cit. supra note 25, § 4.1.
26. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Many courts have adhered to the rigid doctrine of
"passing off" as the rule of unfair competition itself rather than as merely a typical
class of cases, resisting the unjust enrichment approach of the INS decision. See
1 CALLMANN, UNFAIR CompErITION AND TRADEMARKS 60-63, 725-30 (1945).
27. 279 App. Div. 632, 107 N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1949).
28. See Oates, Relief in Equity Against Unfair Trade Practices of Non-Com-
petitors, 25 ILl.. L. REv. 643 (1931).
29. 327 Pa..433, 194 At. 631 (1937).
30. Id. at 454, 194 AUt. at 641.
31. An emerging theory of law which may have been applicable to the instant
case is the "right of publicity," whereby the courts will protect the pecuniary value
attached to use of a public personality's name or photograph in modern commercial
advertising. However, to date it has been recognized in only a few cases. E.g.,
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
See also Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAw & CoNT m,. PRoB. 203 (1954).
32. Instant case at 497.
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through publication, a term of art defined as a disclosure, communication,
circulation, exhibition or distribution of a work so as to imply abandon-
ment to the public.33 It applies only where statutory copyright is unavail-
able or has not been obtained.3 4 In determining whether there has been
a publication, the courts look partly to the objective character of the dis-
semination and partly to the proprietor's intent to relinquish his property
rights.& 5 Performance in itself does not constitute a publication,36 but the
dissent reasoned that by permitting films to be made of the fight and
imposing no express restriction on their use,3 7 plaintiff effected as large
a dissemination of his performance as was possible within the existing
media and consequently lost all rights to legal protection. It should be
noted, however, that where unfair competitive practices have occurred the
courts have often failed to find a publication, although the nature of the
dissemination may have warranted such a finding. 8 The justification in
these instances lies in avoiding the destructive effect of publication as a
defense for unfair acts. 9 By ignoring this interrelationship of the publica-
tion and unfair competition'concepts, it is possible to grant a performer a
perpetual right to recover damages for any new use to which his perform-
ance may be subjected, notwithstanding a general dissemination previously
authorized and without reprehensible conduct in the user. ° Therefore,
unless the competition is such that unlimited protection should be granted
the performer vis-A-vis the competitor, the unauthorized use should be con-
sidered as merely infringement to which publication may be a defense.4'
33. Werckmeister v. American Lithographic, 134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1904).
34. See Warner, Protection of the Contract of Radio and Television Programs
by Common-Law Copyright, 3 V.Azm. L. REv. 209, 221 (1950).
35. Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Co., 327 Pa. 433, 444, 194 At. 631, 636
(1937).
36. Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U.S. 424 (1912) ; McCarthy & Fischer, Inc. v. White,
259 Fed. 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). See also Warner, supra note 34.
37. In the Waring case, the court considered the express restriction to indicate
that a publication had not occurred. 327 Pa. at 442-48, 194 At. at 636-38. But see
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940),
overruled in Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955); Bass, Interpretative Rights of Performing Artists, 42 Dicm. L. Ry. 57, 61-63
(1938).
38. See, e.g., Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., supra note 37;
Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wager-Nichols Recorder Corp., 279 App. Div. 632, 107
N.Y.S.2d 795 (1st Dep't 1949); compare Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad-
casting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938), with National Exhibition Co. v.
Teleflash, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
39. CALLITANN, UNFAIR CoMv TrON AND TRaDEMAae s § 17.2 (2d ed. 1950).
40. Such unlimited protection exceeds even that available under statutory copy-
right. Although creating monopolistic rights in intellectual property subject thereto,
the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1952), limits protection to a specified
period and requires a public dedication of the work upon expiration thereof. See RCA
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940),
overruled in Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657 (2d Cir.
1955); Judge Hand's dissent in Capital Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp.,
supra at 664.
41. See Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940) ; Jewelers'
Mercantile Agency, Ltd. v. Jewelers' Weekly Pub. Co., 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872
(1898).
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